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ABSTRACT

A collection of conferences papers examines social studies as an intellectual discipline and focuses on the idea of a social studies discipline. The papers presented are: "A Discipline of Social Studies" (Ronald Evans); "Discipline, Knowledge, and Social Education" (Jack Nelson); "Reflections on a Discipline of the Social Studies" (Wilma Longstreet); "A Discipline of the Social Studies: Forward to the Basics" (Stanley Wronski); and "A Commentary" (James Barth). (DB)

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A Social Studies Discipline

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Bulletin 2

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Foundations of the Social Studies Special Interest Group

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A Social Studies Discipline

James L. Barth
Ronald Evans
Wilma Longstreet
Jack Nelson
Stanley Wronski

BULLETIN 2

FEBRUARY, 1990

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES / SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP

A SIG OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES

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FOREWORD

This, the second bulletin of the Foundations of the Social Studies/Special Interest Group (Fss/SIG), is again based on papers presented at the National Council for the Social Studies Annual Meeting 1989. The bulletin is one of the publication efforts of the SIG, which has as its specific purpose the publication and dissemination of information on or about the foundations of the social studies.

Before the forming of the SIG in the late 1970s there had been few formal attempts to gather and interpret the historical, philosophical, and sociological foundations. Thus when the "new" social studies emerged in the late 1950s, the social scientists and historians, who proposed to strengthen the social studies instruction essentially through the use of social science project materials, would claim that there were no published foundations other than, the much cited commission reports. Even now the Bradley Commission and the National Commission on Social Studies in the Schools, given their recommendations for reform, have also denied knowledge of or ignored the foundations of the social studies. However, any attempt to reform social studies will surely call for an accurate interpretation of the field. In an effort to continue the dialogue on interpreting the field, the authors in this bulletin were asked to address the theme, "A Discipline of the Social Studies."

Ronald Evans' introduction sets the context for this bulletin: "Thus, I see current interest in the question, 'A Discipline of Social Studies?' as n important first step toward creating a viable theoretical foundations for a new reform."

Jack Nelson, in his paper, "Discipline, Knowledge, and Social Education," offers an unusually sharp analysis of what is a discipline by arguing that history, social science, and emerging fields have never met the criteria for becoming a discipline. He goes on to say, "I am arguing that the current 'disciplines" traditionally identified as within or basic to social studies are the result of historical accident and vested interests." Further, he argues, "Other fields have emerged since the period when social science disciplines were formalized and hardened in all but their rigor. . . . These include jurisprudence, information theory, education, sociolinguistics, women's studies, ethnic studies, and urban studies among others. social study -- can claim membership." He concludes with the proposition that there are three major views of discipline: "(1) that there may be no such thing as a discipline which exists outside of subjective ideological constructs; (2) there may be only one or two real disciplines, philosophy and maybe science; and (3) that the separate structure and mode of inquiry criteria need not be rigorously maintained, and that discipline can be self-justifying."

Wilma Longstreet in her paper, "Reflections on a Discipline of the Social Studies," attacks the question of discipline by examining what social studies content is actually taught in the schools. She argues that history has been the real curriculum of the social studies and suggests that, "hardly a dent has been made in the conduct of the social studies since the post World War II era," and follows with the argument, "the real curriculum of the social studies mean history, there is clearly no need for a discipline of the social studies." Finally she asks a question, "Can a discipline be developed based on the social studies?" She then clearly develops the thought that what is "lacking is not a discipline of the social studies but rather a discipline of citizenship." "It should be noted that if there were a discipline of citizenship, it is entirely probable that it would share the inadequacies of history and the social science disciplines as a basis for the social studies."

The third treatment of the theme is a paper by Stanley Wronski. His paper, "A Discipline of the Social Studies: Forward to the Basics," approaches the theme by addressing the philosophical underpinnings of what is a discipline. He asks, "What should a philosophy of the social studies concern itself with? In Socratic form, the reply may be given that it should attempt to develop a systematic, coherent, definable body of thought about the social studies. And how may this body of thought be organized? Again the reply may be that it can be organized on the basis of (1) structure and (2) process." He first examines the epistemology problems facing social studies, then in succession, problems of ontology and axiology. His insightful analysis, along with the other three authors, are springboards to further commentary on, "If there is a discipline of social studies or citizenship, what ideas exactly would discipline thinking in the field?"

The final paper, a commentary, initiates what will be a continuing discussion on the beliefs that discipline the social studies. This commentary by James Barth identifies "Beliefs that Discipline the Social Studies," a theme for future FSS presentations and publications.

James L. Barth
Editor, FSS/SIG

Walter Schultz
Executive Secretary, FSS/SIG

A Discipline of Social Studies

Ronald W. Evans

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The papers included in this bulletin were presented at a session of the Foundations of the Social Studies Special Interest Group at the November, 1989, meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies. The session was loosely organized around the question posed by its title, "A Discipline of Social Studies?" This central question raises several additional questions:

Is social studies currently a discipline?

If we are not generally recognized as a discipline, should we attempt to construct a discipline ?

What would a discipline of social studies include?

What knowledge, concepts, principles, and modes of inquiry would make up the discipline?

How might the curriculum be changed?

What benefits might result?

And, finally, some practical questions:

What definition for the discipline of social studies might have an impact in the schools? and

Will we ever reach a consensus on any of these questions?

As an advocate of an integrated, issue-centered approach to social studies, I find these questions very intriguing. Unfortunately, over the years the issue-centered vision has found only limited acceptance in the nation's classrooms. During the history of social studies reform, critics have charged that an issue-centered approach is too general and not well organized; that it would lead to an unstructured and purposeless hodgepodge; that it would not require sufficient mental exertion; and that the knowledge, principles and concepts of the traditional disciplines could only be learned through training in the separate disciplines.

Similar criticisms have been leveled against social studies generally. As Diane Ravitch has suggested, "social studies is perennially troubled by an identity crisis. The literature is replete with discussions about what the field is, what territory it covers, what its goals and objectives are..." (Ravitch, 1987).

Of course, the growing revival of history and concomitant attacks on social studies threaten visions of social studies as a unified field, and should call on us to re-examine the conceptual basis for social studies curricula. For social studies to survive and prosper into the next century, we will need to develop more powerful ways of organizing material, and more powerful models of teaching and teacher education. In short, we will need to develop a new synthesis, re-defining what we are about, and creating a more viable discipline of social studies.

The late Hazel Hertzberg implied something similar for advocates of the unitary field approach to social studies when she wrote, "There are good practical reasons for the federationist (discipline based) position. The school subjects are derived from organized bodies of knowledge, the disciplines, which comprise cores of information, theory, interpretation, and methodologies which can be adapted for instructional purposes. The unitary field advocates have no comparable basis on which they can build a curriculum. Despite heroic attempts to do so, they have not been able to detach the social studies from their parent disciplines... Many of the difficulties of the core curriculum grew from the absence of a theoretical foundation that might have enabled subjects to be combined or fused more effectively" (Hertzberg, 1981, 176-177).

Thus, I have come to believe that advocates of an issue-centered approach will need to construct a discipline of social studies - comprised of cores of information, theory, interpretation and methodology - to bring their vision of an integrated, issue-centered field of study closer to realization in schools. This discipline would integrate, synthesize, and apply insights from the social sciences, but must pose a new core, a new theoretical foundation as a basis for organizing a scope and sequence and articulating an approach to teaching. Thus, I see current interest in the question, "A Discipline of Social Studies?" as an important first step toward creating a viable theoretical foundation for a new reform. Yet it is only a first step. Much remains to be done.

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Discipline, Knowledge, and Social Education

Jack L. Nelson

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Each semester I teach an undergraduate introductory education course which typically contains junior level students at Rutgers who are interested in becoming secondary school teachers in the main academic subjects. At Rutgers, for the past twenty-five years, all such students are required to be majors in subjects in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and to have minimum grade averages higher than that needed to graduate.

At an early class session of this course I usually ask the students how many of them are majoring in the liberal arts. Following some puzzlement and some delay to consider my ulterior motives, virtually all of the students finally raise their hands. When I ask then to identify their liberal arts majors, they usually indicate such subjects as history, English, biology, physics, political science, economics, sociology, art, or mathematics. After I then suggest that almost none of them are actually majors in liberal arts fields, they are confused, distressed, or defensive. Thus begin classroom arguments in which they attempt to justify their subject major as "liberal arts", and to imply denigration of "professional" or "vocational" or "useful" subjects.

This is my introduction to the idea of disciplines in the school curriculum, and the assumptions that discipline denotations hide. To support my claims that almost none of my bright and academically talented students is actually majoring in liberal arts, I use as my definition of liberal arts the excessively traditional and prescriptive list of the Seven Liberal Arts from the Middle Ages. The Trivium and Quadrivium were, after all, codified by the dominant academics of their time in what was a losing attempt to assure the status of select leisure-class knowledge. This may not be a proper measure of the liberal arts quality of the majors taken by current Rutgers students, but it poses the essential questions of how disciplines are defined and what those definitions signify.

Few students, except the lone music major and a few mathematics majors in my classes, fit the ancient and ignored definition. Does that mean that the students are not really liberal arts majors, or does it mean that the definitions have simply changed to reflect different views of knowledge? Of course, the latter is the case. Have the changes in defining categories of knowledge occurred as a result of sophistication and improved logic that have made the newer definitions better? There is no evidence that demonstrates that to be the case; it is merely an example of the politics of knowledge at work. The

essential issue in this aspect of the politics of knowledge is the distribution of power; who get to decide on what is a discipline and what criteria are used? It is the politics of knowledge that frame a current interest in the question of whether or not there is or should be a discipline of social studies.

Anyone moderately supportive of the critical literature on knowledge and curriculum (Anyon 1978; Apple, 1979; Arnot & Whitty, 1982; Giroux, 1981; Popkiewitz, 1977; Young, 1971) should have some justifiable trepidation in advocating a discipline of anything, including social studies. That literature, in itself, is not sufficient grounds to deny social studies equal status in the popular list of disciplines, but these critical ideas should not be ignored in attempting to make an intellectual case for a discipline of social studies.

As the critical literature argues, the concept of discipline as a construct for knowledge is laden with ideological, not logical, baggage. Disciplines are the refuge of disciples, not the carriers of critical thinking. One of the means used to sterilize basic inquiry into the relations between knowledge and power is to raise discipline barriers that cast the unanointed outside and the disciples within. It is an easy shot to declare that X is not a historian (or economist, or anthropologist, or...), thus there is no reason to consider X's work on human issues as scholarly. In order to be a member, one has to accept the dogma of the field. From a critical perspective, the defining of knowledge barriers is tied up with issues of cultural hegemony, cultural capital, and ideological interests (Apple, 1979; Giroux, 1981).

Traditional disciplines have not looked favorably upon critiques based on this perspective since they threaten the conceived status and contrived rationales of these fields. Thus, despite the oft-stated presumption in disciplines that criticism is the means of correction and improvement of knowledge in each field, the act of root criticism of the field is not encouraged - it is, more often, rejected or ignored. The nature, form, and agents of criticism are limited by the boundaries established by inside members of the discipline, and there is discipline and paradigm self-protection built into this condition. This is not the place to more fully develop this point, but it is made here to provide a caution to the effort to define social studies as a discipline. This effort should not lose sight of a critical perspective that raises serious and thoughtful questions about knowledge and challenges all discipline definitions. the field of social studies should seek equivalent status on equivalent grounds, retaining a critical stance on the nature of knowledge and knowledge claims. The latter has all too often been forgotten in the claims on school curriculum and attempted discipline hegemony of history and certain of the social sciences.

In addition to a significantly critical perspective on disciplines, there are at least two other views of what constitutes a discipline. One view is that there may be only one or two disciplines in the pure sense (probably only philosophy and maybe science), and none as a separate entity in areas usually covered in social studies curricula in the schools. From this view, social studies is not a discipline, but then neither are history and the several social sciences or the new or emerging fields of social inquiry. Included in this generalization are: traditionally recognized fields of social inquiry such as history, political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, geography, religion, philosophy, and psychology; contemporary social field such as law, education, literature, and ethics and women's studies; and such emerging fields as systems theory, gerontology, information theory, future studies, game theory, world order studies, and science-related social issues (Nelson and Michaelis, 1980).

The claim that history, the traditional social sciences, and the emerging fields do not meet the most intellectually rigorous tests of discipline status rests upon the idea that a discipline can only be identified by demonstrating a unique set of laws or principles and a unique mode of inquiry. The 1960s effort to establish the separateness of social disciplines produced an extensive literature and extraordinary self-justification, but no long-term logical basis for meeting these two conditions for discipline status as set down by Jerome Bruner (1960) in The Process of Education. The fields identified have not yet provided a separate structure of basic principles and a specific mode of inquiry. These may not be the only, or even the best criteria for determining disciplines, but they are widely recognized.

Cambridge University philosopher Paul Hirst (1974) elaborated these two primary criteria for disciplines into four: "certain concepts peculiar in character", "distinctive logical structure", "distinctive expressions that are testable against experience", and "particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions" (p. 44). But the essence of his first two is a distinctive set of principles, and of the latter two is a distinctive mode of inquiry. Further, his list of disciplines included math, physical science, history, philosophy, arts, religion, literature, and something called "human sciences". In my opinion his list failed to fully meet the criteria he established and his discussion of how these fit was not persuasive.

It is my view that history and the other social fields of knowledge do not meet the rigorous logical tests of uniqueness in structure and methodology that a pure discipline would meet. This is a view that is philosophically pleasing because the criteria are reasoned and thoughtful and one can examine any potential discipline in terms of them. Does history have a set of law-like principles and a unique methodology? Does political

science or geography or sociology? It is my assessment, explored later, that they do not. Does my assessment block the claim of discipline status for these fields? Of course not. The idea of discipline is not a logical construct with clear and equally applied canons; it is as suggested, ideological (Nelson, 1981). This first view of discipline is intellectually pleasing, but it is not pleasing to those whose careers or ideologies depend upon a less rigorous definition of discipline.

A second view of discipline accepts this ideological conception within the politics of knowledge and examines the grounds for claims of discipline status in terms of such factors as: tradition, popularity, potential strength, legitimacy accorded by high status individuals or institutions, and acceptability among the avant-garde. In this instance, the purpose for examining these grounds is to use them in determining if or when social studies can be considered a discipline. Applying this less rigorous set of criteria, one is led to a standard dictionary definition of discipline: "a branch of knowledge involving research" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary). This definition may not be very helpful in separating disciplines from non-disciplines, since many more fields than those identified in this paper involve research; but it is a start.

I am arguing that the current "disciplines" traditionally identified as within or basic to social studies are the result of historical accident and vested interests. As hypotheses, I submit the following: 1) had social studies been identified as a term of use in schooling in the 1890s, when many of the social science fields emerged with protective professional associations, it would now have the status of a discipline; 2) had the leading figures in social studies in the early twentieth century been what became its second class status as an amalgam of the social sciences diluted for use in precollegiate schools, social study might have been identified as an established discipline.

In this second view within the politics of knowledge, it is not that disciplines have discrete boundaries and clear purposes and operations, but that they have some history of being identified as disciplines by their disciples and others of high academic status and little counterargument from outside. This is a contextual and temporal basis for definition and is especially responsive to the politics of knowledge. It creates the conditions for self-justification and efforts to prevent other fields from encroachment.

The self-justification of select disciplines and rejection of others by implication, using unsupported claims, is exemplified most recently in the Report of the National Commission on the Social Studies in the Schools (Charting a Course, 1989). This Report, relying excessively on but not demonstrating the presumed values of history, ignored new and emerging fields of social study and made only passing and

subordinate reference to most of the traditional social sciences in proposing a standardized social studies curriculum for the nation. The establishment, development, and momentum of this Commission presents a case study in the politics of knowledge.

The Commission responded to interests of the American Historical Association, the National Geographic Society, and some sympathetic members of the leadership of the National Council for the Social Studies. In an uncritical acceptance of claims that students test scores showed that history and geography were not being learned, and without an examination of other reasons or conditions in schools, the Commission proposed - not surprisingly - that a greater dose of history with minor excursions into geography would cure this educational ailment. Ignored, among other things was the traditional dominance of history in the social studies curriculum: certainly that dominance was not implicated by the Commission as among the causes of the declining student test scores in those subjects most studied in the social studies curriculum.

The Commission, apparently intent on stomping out any knowledge that does not come filtered through history and historians, designed a curriculum in which several of the traditional social sciences are approached only through history. Thus, sociology, anthropology, and political science were addressed in this curriculum only within the context of historical study. Other emerging fields of study were left out of the curriculum. Most importantly, social issues and problems were eschewed except at the end of the high school program after students had been sufficiently swamped with repetitive historical information and tradition to keep them from an innovative idea or consideration of contemporary human issues. The Commission Report, unresponsive to critical comments on the draft document circulated earlier, was presented at the National Council for the Social Studies meeting in St. Louis in 1989. Commission funding provided for a massive mailing to all NCSS members and, despite very vociferous and often compelling criticisms presented at the NCSS meeting, the Report was mailed in an apparent attempt to convince those who had not attended the oral presentations at the national meeting.

Among the criticisms, ironically, was that the 1989 Commission had intentionally ignored or distorted the extensive scholarly literature of the field including the widely respected volumes by very distinguished historians and social scientists who were members of the previous National Commission which operated during the period, 1926-38 (see, for example, Beard, 1934; Merriam, 1934; Curti, 1935; Beale, 1936).

Included as appendices in the published Report of the 1989 National Commission were essays which purportedly represented a small group of social science disciplines, without explanation of the means or criteria for selection, written by advocates of those fields. These statements, interestingly, do not address

the particular curriculum proposed by the Commission, but are attempts to describe the structure of that discipline and explain why each should be part of any school curriculum. The identified social sciences selected for inclusion in this set of statements are limited to anthropology, economics, geography, psychology, and sociology, while there are two separate essays on American history and World history. The logic for this is not presented.

The self-justifications presented in these statements are similar to, though often more elementary than, much of the body of literature of the 1960s which tried to separate the fields into disciplines by identifying the particular structure and mode of inquiry for each. An examination of this literature on the structure and modes of inquiry claims of separate discipline enthusiasts is informative. Presumably, within one of the views of what constitutes a discipline, a discipline may be defined in terms of its separability from other fields of study on these two grounds. It is my position that such separation fails.

In history, for example, Collingwood (1956) and Fenton (1966) agree on a definition that "history is a kind of research or inquiry" to "find out about the actions of people in the past" by "interpreting evidence" and encouraging "reflective thinking leading to human knowledge". My suspicion is that this definition could be used in any humanities or social science field, and in the social studies. It provides neither separate structure of principles or a separate mode of inquiry. History, devoted primarily to written records, is a worthy subject of study to gather data to help inform social problems but does not satisfy the Brunerian conditions. History might like to claim time as in its domain, but history is insufficient in its examination and understanding of time. It relies heavily on documents and is skeptical of other data; it commonly exempts prehistory, current happenings, and futuristics; and it has been especially suited to manipulation by nationalistic and economic ideologies.

Anthropology is defined by Clyde Kluckhohn (1949) as "an overlapping study with bridges into the physical, biological, and social sciences and into the humanities." Dubois (1963) adds that it "properly encompasses the biologic, psychologic, social and cultural aspects of man". These are, at least, open-minded and about as imperialistic in their envelopment of all other fields as the rest of the social science fields. Social studies could take this approach in its definition as a discipline.

For geography, Richard Hartshorn (1959) notes that it provides the chorological principle, relating things and events by areal association. Preston James (1965) agrees, noting three purposes for geography: "a general understanding of the arrangement of things and events over the whole surface of the earth." Where does that leave history, anthropology, political science, sociology and the rest? If physical geography is the limit of interest in the field, it would have few overlapping

boundaries and more clarity as a separate discipline. That is not the case, and geographers claim a larger share of knowledge than mere land, water and air.

Sociology claims to cover the study of society and is no less encompassing of all knowledge (Rose, 1966; Inkeles, 1964). Jenks (1977) incorporated philosophy, language, science, literature, culture, and mind within sociology's purview, while Young (1971) and Bernbaum (1977) place the whole of knowledge within the domain of sociology.

Psychology has been defined similarly as a synthesizing discipline which studies "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule or authority." (Dahl, 1963) Easton (1965) commented that "what distinguishes political interactions from all other kinds of social interactions is that they are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society." I find that not a very distinguishing separation, since history, economics, anthropology, cultural geography, psychology, education, law, women's studies, religion and philosophy could make similar claims about their concerns for human interactions and authority in allocation of values.

For example, although political science claims values and human interaction as part of its study, economics has the same claim. Von Mises (1949) suggested that economics, "as a branch of a more general theory of human action, deals with all human action. . ." Further, the sought after set of law-like principles that makes the structure of economics suited to discipline status have not been discerned, but ideology has (Nelson & Carlson, 1981). Hollingsworth (1982) notes the "widely held view that the discipline of economics is in disarray", and a special interest of The Public Interest (1980), titled, "The Crisis in Economic Theory", contains several papers critical of the field's inability to generate those basic principles or laws of explanation. There is some refreshing honesty in this appraisal.

Other fields have emerged since the period when social science disciplines were formalized and hardened in all but their rigor. These latecomers lay claim to being social sciences, and are as legitimate in their claims to be disciplines under the second view proposed. These include jurisprudence, information theory, education, sociolinguistics, women's studies, ethnic studies, and urban studies, among others. These fields have their disciples and their bodies of research and theoretic literature. What they don't have is status granted by the class of traditional disciplines already in existence.

Within this view of disciplines, social studies - or perhaps social study - can claim membership. We can admit that our law-like principles are equal to other social sciences in their non-existence or invalidity and that we share in modes of inquiry

with all other fields. We do studies that use document study, philosophic analysis, statistical treatment, policy analysis, interviews, case study, simulations, chronological sequencing, areal placement, surveys, quasi-experimental structures, and whatever else is used in the traditional subjects. We have identified problems that seem of importance to people in the field and have developed a collection of research publications. We have a number of weaknesses, including slightly more modesty than our colleagues in the traditional social sciences, and we need to devote more energy to improving our work and our expression of interests.

There are at least three major views of discipline. One holds that there may be no such thing as a discipline which exists outside of subjective ideological constructs, and that the conditions of dialectic criticism would permit no long term constancy out of which disciplines could emerge as entities which can ignore fundamental criticism. This would allow temporary discipline status for any field which wished to explore itself. Social studies would seem to fit within this view as such a discipline. A second view is that there are only one or two real disciplines: philosophy and maybe science. Social studies and other social sciences and humanities, do not fulfill criteria to be disciplines under this view. The third view is that the separate structure and mode of inquiry criteria need not be rigorously maintained and that a discipline can be self-justifying, needing only to gain credibility in the eyes of those who have status. Using models and examples from the existing disciplines, it can be shown that social studies deserves equal treatment and, with some modifications in research, is worthy of consideration as a discipline.

It may be that in order to develop a discipline <u>of</u> social studies we need first to establish more discipline <u>for</u> social studies. That would require more extensive and more focused scholarly pursuit and more open critical examination of our efforts. This approach to discipline, whether or not it leads to a discipline of social studies, would be of benefit to the field and to education (Nelson and Shaver, 1985; Wallen and Fraenkel, 1988).

If becoming a discipline means giving up flexibility and opportunity for critical study, it is too high a price. If becoming a discipline merely means that social studies is recognized as equivalent to other fields of inquiry, then we should make that claim and get on with the work of establishing and refining the field's body of literature.

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Reflections on a Discipline of the Social Studies

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History, the Real Curriculum of the Social Studies

Throughout most of this century, there has been a debate about the nature of the social studies and what should or should not be in the curriculum. Among others, there is the Wesleyan position[1] that the social studies are the social sciences simplified for pedagogical purposes. In sharp contrast, there is the Engle position[2] that controversial issues, critical evaluation and the decision making of citizens ought to be at the heart of social studies instruction. There is Fraenkel who states a position[3] widely held but awesome in its vast implication that all of life can "be considered as a data bank for the social studies" since they are primarily about the study of human social experience.

Throughout all this discussion, the development of citizenship, while not the only goal, has been the one goal that has gathered near unanimous agreement. Unfortunately, this has done little to abate the diversity of views regarding the nature of the social studies. The wide-spread, de facto assumption that the definition of citizenship is self-evident and offers an obvious basis for organizing the social studies curriculum, has left the curriculum open to all sorts of interpretations.

The discussion about the nature of the social studies often seems unending and pointless for hardly a dent has been made in the conduct of the social studies in the schools since the post World War II era. The K - 12 real curriculum, that is, the one we actually find implemented in the schools, is based primarily on the study of history, which, as a field, is usually included among the humanities rather than the social sciences. Regardless of the correctness of this judgment, it is clear that historiological research methodologies are quite distinct from those pursued typically by the sciences. Almost as an after-thought, the real curriculum is also likely to include over the twelve year period of public schooling, a semester, possibly two, in geography as well as one or two in civics or government. When funds permit and the local powers are willing, students may select an elective from such social sciences as psychology, sociology and economics.

Somewhat erratically and not really in keeping with the emphasis on disciplinary studies, but rather as an occasional response to public pressure, urgent social problems have been turned into social studies units or even courses. Thus, teenage pregnancy, consumer education, career education, and drug

education, to name but a few, may be found among social studies offerings.

However, notwithstanding the seeming diversity of studies available, the content of the real curriculum is based with singular emphasis on history. There appears to be very little dissatisfaction with that state of affairs except among a few scholars of the field who conceive the social studies to be about the development of effective citizenship for living in and sustaining a democracy and who do not see the current curriculum as capable of achieving such a goal. Indeed, the so-called reformers of the eighties appear to have been primarily involved with strengthening the history component of the school's real curriculum. There is, for instance, the Bradley Commission on History in Schools which proposed boosting history instruction because of the low scores students made on standardized tests, and the strong position taken by former Secretary of Education, William J. Bennett, that the schools ought to place their primary emphasis in the social studies on the history of Western civilization. We are now confronted with a new report, to be issued in November 1989, by the National Commission on the Social Studies in Schools, a group formed by the American Historical Association, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the National Council for the Social Studies and the Organization of American Historians.

Not surprisingly, the Commission recommends three years of world history for the high school curriculum. Whether one prefers world history to the history of Western civilization is certainly an important point for discussion in its own right; in the context of this paper, however, it is more important to recognize that whatever discussion may develop between those of Bennett's persuasion and the members of the Commission, the discussion is about history. There is already a discipline of history and a cadre of scholars seeking to develop historical knowledge. To the extent that the real curriculum of the social studies means history, there is clearly no need for a discipline of the social studies.

Indeed, I would suggest that history and the social sciences have maintained and increased their hold over the social studies curriculum because they are based on disciplines that can serve as vital sources of objective knowledge. On the other hand, those aspects of social studies based on the development of citizenship remain largely topical, issue-oriented and without the power of an accumulating knowledge base typical of the disciplines. Goals that can be directly associated with history or economics or geography or some other discipline independent of the school subject have fared better in the school's curriculum in terms of status and time allocated for study than has the goal to develop citizenship.

In this regard, it is also important to recognize that the success of social studies teaching in the schools, whatever

particular bent may be given to the study of history, is most likely to be measured by multiple choice tests asking factual, historical questions and not by any measure of the quality of citizenship performance or of any of the skills that we have come to associate with the processes of decision making and reflective inquiry. While there is much discourse among politicians and the public-at-large about the schools developing good citizenship qualities in our young and contributing to the continuation of democratic principles, there is little evidence that these concerns are given anything but lip service in the real curriculum of the social studies. Factual knowledge of history is the primary content of the real curriculum.

The Viability and Worth of Social Studies as a Discipline

This brings me to the matter at hand. Can a discipline be developed based on the social studies? Would it be a worthwhile enterprise? I have already noted that if we were to look only at the dominant content of the real social studies curriculum, there would be no need to even consider establishing the social studies as a discipline. The discipline is history and the social studies is its pedagogical interpretation. However, there has always been a view of the social studies as being a school subject that bridges disciplines in its effort to develop citizenship in the young. I should like to explore the question of developing a discipline of the social studies from this perspective.

The social studies were developed to be a school subject in the first decades of this century not so much to provide the education of citizens as to protect the discipline of history from the potpourri of literary history, moral purposes and patriotic values that had typified civic education in the schools.[6] Because of the influx of millions of non-English speaking immigrants, mostly concentrated in the large urban areas, where they often out-numbered the original inhabitants, the demand had grown urgent for schools to accomplish the assimilation of this disparate multitude into the citizenry. Communicating a sense of civic responsibility and of national belonging fell to the schools to accomplish. At the same time, around the turn of the twentieth century, there was a powerful movement to make history scientific history. The social studies (and not history!) were to become the main curricular vehicle for the development of citizenship. The school subject could be about fostering democratic principles as this Nation had come to understand them; it could be about patriotism and those family values often said to be the backbone of the Nation without impinging on the principles relevant to disciplines and the achievement of knowledge.

Far from anyone's mind was the idea of developing a scientific or even a humanistic discipline of the social studies. The question was not one of achieving new knowledge, -- that could be accomplished by the social sciences and history out in

the professional fields, -- but rather of fostering and even indoctrinating when necessary, the appropriate behaviors of citizenship among large alien multitudes. At the same time, and with blatant disregard for the inherent contradictions in their position, the historians and social scientists urged the school study of each of their disciplines as the best way to prepare "good" citizens. The conflict between value-free, objectively-oriented studies based on disciplines and value-laden, civic education which stressed patriotism, love of family, punctuality at work, loyalty to our American democracy and the like was conveniently ignored, or poorly understood, if at all.

The NEA 1916 Committee on Social Studies defined the social studies rather ambiguously as "those whose subject matter relates directly to the organization and development of human society, and to man as a member of social groups."[7] This is clearly a definition as broad as life itself and hardly capable of establishing the parameters of a new discipline. Furthermore, the Committee added in its discussion of aims that the 7 - 12 social studies curriculum should develop in the young a sense of responsibility toward their social group and a willingness, "to participate effectively in the promotion of the group's social well being."[8] They went on to say that the "cultivation of good citizenship" should be the constant purpose of high school social studies.[9] Children were to be considered citizens of their neighborhood as well as citizens of the world, whatever that may mean. Notwithstanding aims such as these, the Committee went on to propose a curriculum for the secondary schools based largely on the disciplines of history and geography.[10]

The omission of definitions concerning such key terminology as "citizen" and "community" certainly would have undermined the establishment of a discipline, if that had been even remotely in the minds of the Committee's membership. The use of such value laden terms as "good," "true 'neighborliness'" and "national loyalty," makes it patently clear that the members had accepted socialization and indoctrination as valid functions of the social studies. Quite possible, these are valid functions for the school subject; they are hardly viable functions in the systematic, objectively-oriented study of social phenomena and human activity that is essential to the development of either scientific or humanistic disciplines. Clearly, if the social studies are to be viewed as potentially a discipline, the very foundations of the school subject would need to be reconsidered.

Although circumstances have changed significantly since the early years of this century, the issue remains how to educate citizens for effective participation in a democracy. This is inevitably a value-laden undertaking that is hardly the stuff of disciplines.

Citizenship: A Discipline

The doubts, conflicts and emotional involvement that typify a citizen's inquiry into significant socio-economic problems are

a far cry from the benignly-held objectivity of the discipline based scholar. There are two problems that we as social educators must confront with regard to history and the social science disciplines: 1) how appropriate are they as a basis for preparing citizens, and 2) how useful are they as a source of knowledge about citizenship. These are hardly distinct problems but they do address different aspects of our efforts to prepare citizens. The first deals with the wisdom of utilizing history and the social sciences to fulfill the purposes of the social studies; the second seeks to establish a source of knowledge about citizenship.

This is not to say that history and the social sciences have not provided important content for the social studies, but rather to question their sufficiency as the major source of knowledge about citizenship. Each has honed and refined its area of specialization. Political science has concentrated on the exercise of power, political legitimacy, de facto and de jure segregation, voting behavior and so forth, while few of its scholarly efforts have been turned toward the nature and meaning of citizenship. History has systematically recorded and explained the great events of the past, but it has examined citizenship only sporadically and hardly with the systematic effort that one can observe with regard to wars or momentous inventions. Anthropologists have directed their interest in culture toward the urban environment, but have hardly pursued citizenship in terms of different cultural environments. Sociologists have concentrated on statistical representations of social institutions and the norms and values undergirding them. Economists have been caught up in questions of scarcity and the distribution of wealth.

In sum, as history and the social scientists are configured today, there is a significant lacuna in our source of knowledge about citizenship. On the whole, neither the social sciences nor history grapple directly with the concept of citizenship. There is seemingly nowhere to go for an extended, in-depth study of the phenomena related to being a citizen. This has in turn weakened that part of the social studies curriculum intended to be about citizenship and the meaning of citizenship behavior in a democracy.

We hardly know what the term, citizenship, means let alone its likely evolution under differing circumstances. For example, now well over seventy years ago, the NEA Committee on the Social Studies noted that the child is a citizen not only of his local community but of our nation [11] and the world [12] as well. The idea of global citizenship has strengthened over the years, and we are even less clear today than we were decades ago about the implications this holds for citizenship. Questions abound but remain vague and unanswered. Is citizenship at the local community level the same kind of citizenship referred to at the global level? Is there a basis for expecting that a citizen's community activities will conflict with the same citizen's global

activities. If this were to be the case, how would/should precedence be determined? In what ways does the type of government, say an oligarchy or a republic, impact on the definition of citizenship? On what basis do we decide such questions as these?

What appears to be lacking is not a discipline of the social studies but rather a discipline of citizenship. The functions of the school subject, that is the social studies, are essentially different from those of a discipline. As Shaver noted in a 1967 article, the social studies need to be about, "that part of the school's general education program ...concerned with the preparation of citizens for participation in a democratic society." [Italics sic.][13] The social studies need to be about practical applications of knowledge for the purpose of achieving effective citizenship. On the other hand, a discipline of citizenship would undertake to lay the theoretical bases of knowledge about citizenship, systematizing a series of definitions, concepts and generalizations that might ultimately lead to greater understanding about phenomena related to citizenship.

This brings us to the other problem. Are history and the social science disciplines, even if taught as they are pursued out in the real world of scholarship, suitable content for the social studies? In this context, it is worth while noting that scholars can suspend judgment until they believe they have a defensible basis for developing conclusions. This is an admirable trait in a scholar but pure folly in a citizen. Citizens must act regardless of the state of their knowledge; they must call what knowledge they have at their disposal into practice; they must make decisions and take actions for not to do so is still a decision and an action. While history and the social science disciplines are hardly concerned with this need to decide and act, the social studies are, or at least ought to be, the practical preparation for this reality.

Doubts about the suitability of history and the social sciences to serve as the basic content of the social studies go well beyond the need to decide and act and are of long standing. Newman pointed out in a memorable article published in the November 1967 issue of Social Education[14] that history and the social sciences are inadequate in two important respects: 1) they neglect the prescriptive questions of value and policy with which citizens must deal continually,[15] and 2) they exclude from their study a great many experiences of considerable significance for citizenship but of not much concern in traditional, scholarly pursuits.[16] Thus, political science describes the structures of government while largely ignoring the multitude of moral, social and political decisions through which citizens interact with their government. Sociology analyzes our social institutions and economics purports to predict our fiscal future, but neither tell us very much about the kinds of decision-making processes involved in the daily exercise of citizenship. Among their goals

is value-free objectivity, while the exercise of citizenship is value-laden and fundamentally subjective and needs to remain so.

It should be noted that if there were a disciplined study of citizenship, it is entirely probable that it would share the inadequacies of history and the social science disciplines as a basis for the social studies. That is, scholars would in all likelihood suspend judgment and avoid action, and they would aspire to value-free objectivity. The area of their concern would, however, be more directly linked to the purposes of the social studies. Unlike the other disciplines, a discipline of citizenship would at least not take the understanding of and knowledge about citizenship for granted. It would at least contribute actively to the definition of citizenship which many of us believe is at the heart of the social studies.

The definitions of citizenship that have been utilized in the field of social studies have been painfully inadequate. The term, "citizenship," was not defined by the 1916 Committee nor did the committee even express doubts about its true extent and nature. It was just taken for granted. The 1984 NCSS Taskforce on Scope and Sequence did define the term, "citizenship," as referring to an individual who is "fully franchised as a member of a political community."[17] That is literally like not having a definition since it is of little use in analyzing any of the difficult questions that have arisen in regard to the nature of citizenship. What does "fully franchised" mean in a global context? What does it mean for the "unalienable rights" so earnestly declared for human kind by our founding fathers?

Numerous social studies curricular designs have been set forth since 1916, many based on quite different, but often undeclared conceptions of citizenship. For instance, Superka and Hawke[18] designed their curriculum around seven social roles believed to be performed by everyone in society and to contribute either directly or indirectly to citizenship; the "Citizen Participation Curriculum" by Newman et. al.[19] involved students in local community advocacy; and the NCSS Taskforce on Scope and Sequence[20] emphasized developing knowledge about such areas of public concern as the diverse economic, political, religious and social systems in the contemporary world, the history and geography of our closest neighbors, and American history, all with some direct or indirect purpose of preparing effective citizens for a democracy.

If we were to judge from the diversity of curricula, we would be forced to say that citizenship appears to be whatever the curriculum developer says it is.[21] Lacking a solid source for knowledge about citizenship, the social studies have become either pedagogical replicas of history and the social science disciplines or obscure interpretations of citizenship dependent on the opinions of individual curriculum developers.

Unless we succeed in developing some basic knowledge about the nature of citizenship, the different ways it functions, how these ways interact with each other, how personal life and citizenship life function both separately and interactively, social studies objectives involving the development of citizenship are likely to remain unaccomplished as I believe is the case right now. Developing a discipline of citizenship would establish a source of knowledge independent of the social studies and its curriculum developers, which is a necessary first step in achieving the purposes of the social studies set forth so long ago.

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A Discipline of the Social Studies: Forward To The Basics

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A discipline implies a body of practitioners or disciples. Disciples imply a body of beliefs. A body of beliefs constitutes a philosophy. So it should not be surprising that, if we are to talk about a discipline, we should also address the philosophical underpinnings of that discipline.

Before beginning our explorations into philosophical considerations relating to the social studies as a discipline, it is well to establish some rough compass point directions toward which we would like to move or at least to mark off some directions toward which we do not intend to move. On the latter point, for example, I think it is well to indicate that a philosophy of the social studies is not to be construed as identical with a philosophy of the social sciences nor is it precisely the same as a philosophy of history or a philosophy of education. Obviously it will draw upon insights from these disciplines but it should be looked upon as coexistent with them and, like them, stemming from the common intellectual heritage of the general area of philosophy itself.

Now that the underbrush is cleared somewhat, let me start hacking out some crude footpaths. I have no illusions about the crudeness of these initial paths. My only hope is that they will prompt others to come along and build two lane roads and still others to design super highways in their stead.

What should a philosophy of the social studies concern itself with? In Socratic form, the reply may be given that it should attempt to develop a systematic. coherent, definable body of thought about the social studies. And how may this body of thought be organized? Again the reply may be that it can be organized on the basis of (1) structure and (2) process. The emphasis in my remaining remarks will be on these two aspects.

The structure of any philosophical system may be described in various ways. One may consider its historical development and trace it chronologically from its inception to the present. For example, a person describing humanism may place its origins somewhere during the Renaissance period and describe its development to the present, taking into account various off-shoots, related areas, or contemporary manifestations known as neo-humanism. Similarly, structure may be described in terms of

how a particular philosophy views the general philosophical virtues of the good, the beautiful, and the true. I propose instead to use as the framework for the structure of a philosophy of the social studies three traditional branches of philosophical inquiry: epistemology, the study of knowledge; ontology, the study of reality; and axiology, the study of values.

At this point a brief parenthetical insertion is necessary. I am assuming the acceptance of the usual distinctions found in the literature between the social sciences and the social studies. They are both defined as being concerned with the area of human relationships, including man's relations with man, his relations with groups, and his relations with nature. But whereas the social sciences are concerned with these relationships for the purpose of adding to the sum total of our knowledge about them, the social studies are primarily concerned with the utilization of this knowledge for instructional purposes. It should be apparent, however, that some of the basic problems faced by the social scientist -- the nature of freedom, for example -- are also faced by the social studies teacher and student. But the fact that both the social studies and social sciences are concerned at times with a common problem should not logically negate what I have suggested before, that is, the distinctiveness of the social studies as a discipline. As an analogy we could point out that both religion and political science are concerned with the problem of individualism, but it is still generally agreed that the study of religion and the study of political science are two distinct disciplines.

Epistemology

What, first of all, are some epistemological problems faced in the social studies? Or, stated another way, on what basis do we know what we presume to know in the social studies?

Perhaps no area on the philosophical domain has been invaded more often in recent years than the epistemological bailiwick. C. P. Snow's The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959) has as a central theme the divergent ways by which the scientist and the humanist gain their knowledge. Israel Scheffler's Conditions of Knowledge (1965) specifically addresses the epistemological question, "What is knowledge?" and treats the question within an educational context. Within the social sciences perhaps the sharpest epistemological cleavage is found among those sociologists who look to neo-positivism and the natural sciences as a model for the pursuit of knowledge and other sociologists (who are probably in a minority) who still feel that insights and intuitive "leaps in the darkness" are more productive of significant knowledge about social behavior. Maurice Natanson in his Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1963) has categorized these two extreme positions as that of naturalism versus subjectivism. Since the social studies are dependent upon the social sciences and frequently utilize their content for instructional purposes, it is worth one's while to pursue this

distinction.

This dichotomy between objective and subjective judgments has fallen under the general rubric of structuralism versus poststructuralism. (Macksey and Donato, 1971; Cherryholmes, 1988) The tenor of poststructural critical theory is expressed by Rorty when he writes:

> The burden of my argument so far has been that if we get rid of traditional notions of "objectivity" and "scientific method" we shall be able to see the social sciences as continuous with literature -- as integrating other people to us, and thus enlarging and deepening our sense of community. (1983, p. 203)

In setting up these opposites on an epistemological continuum I am equating (as Natanson does) naturalism with such synonyms as natural science, the scientific method, and neo-positivism. The gist of this position is that the only way by which man can acquire any really valid knowledge -- whether it be of the physical or the social world -- is by precise identification, observation and measurement of physical or social entities. You are familiar, I am sure, with the broad outlines of this position. A political scientists, for example, operating under this commitment would tend to establish a workable hypothesis about some aspect of political behavior. He would gather data, preferably the kind that is amenable to quantification, make analyses (statistical or otherwise) that these data suggest, and reach a conclusion that can be logically supported by the data. Like the natural scientist he is especially solicitous about the limits of applicability of his data. His conclusions are rigidly circumscribed. Among his cardinal sins are those of over-extending his findings, generalizing on insufficient data, and (probably most grievous of all) expressing some hunches or insights only triggered off or suggested by the data but in no way "supported" by them, meaning by this, statistically supported.

We can contrast the above position with its opposite on the continuum. In its most extreme form we have those who see the fine arts as a vehicle for gaining knowledge about our world. A poem, a symphony, an abstract drawing -- these are all expected to convey something to its reader, listener, or viewer. Attached to this something is some kind of mental construct about it. A mental construct conveys some kind of meaning. Meaning implies understanding. Understanding implies knowledge. Nor are these the most extreme examples that may be given. The Buddhist state of nirvana, for example, is a sublime feeling not only of peace but of understanding in which one's knowledge of self, spirit, and cosmos is complete.

For our purposes as social studies teachers, however, we need not dwell at length with this second extreme. We can bring this position much closer to the other end of the continuum but

still keep it separated enough to pose a genuine epistemological problem. I have reference to the distinction between the scientific way of knowing and the verstehen way of knowing. Verstehen in this context means more than the English literal translation "understanding." It is a deeper, interpretive kind of understanding in which one intuitively grasps the meaning of the "big picture" as well as its details. Alfred Schultz (1963) refers to it as a kind of "common-sense" thinking (a term incidentally which is more often than not used as one of reproach or scorn by the neo-positivists). Verstehen, Schultz says, is "the particular experiential form in which common-sense thinking takes cognizance of the social cultural world. (1963, p. 239) Social scientists committed to this means of seeking knowledge would be likely, for example, to roam rather freely over their discipline, uncovering interesting relationships here and there, warning of inconsistencies internally or externally in relation to other disciplines, and especially stressing a panoramic view of the forest rather than a myopic view of the trees. For this reason they tend to eschew the isolated, extremely delimited, nose-counting, computer print-out type of social research.

The issue of which one of these two broad approaches to ways of knowing has indeed produced the most valid knowledge is far from settled. Even more unsettled is the issue of which way ought to be used for discovering more knowledge. The implications of this uncertainty for the social studies can be logically inferred. Classroom teachers, whether they knew it or not, whether they consciously ally themselves with one position or the other, whether they verbalize their philosophical leanings or not, will tend toward one or the other position along the continuum. At a minimum they should understand these possible positions. We hope they can do even better and reduce instances of taking inconsistent or mutually exclusive positions.

Before leaving the matter of epistemology I should like to call attention to one problem in social studies that I feel merits our serious concern. It is the increasing indication of a parting of ways between the disciplines of history and those of the other social sciences. The very introduction and increasing use of the term behavioral sciences has further tended to consolidate the image of such areas as sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, and psychology. Conspicuously absent from most such groupings of behavioral science is the area of history. And yet we know that within the elementary and secondary school curriculum, history is not only a part of the social studies but usually is the most prominent area within the total range of offerings in the social studies. The potentially serious matter for the social studies programs in the schools arises out of a fundamentally different epistemological commitment of the parent disciplines of history and the other social sciences. The vast majority of historians tend to reject as inappropriate to their discipline the ways of knowing that the other social scientists tend (again, by a vast majority) to accept. In methodology, in outlook, in orientation, historians

tend to ally themselves with the humanities; the other social scientists in turn tend to ally themselves with the natural sciences. And yet the two are not only expected to merge, but actually to marry and live happily in the elementary and secondary schools. What is desperately needed is some kind of epistemological synthesis of these two. The prospects for this taking place at the collegiate and graduate level in the foreseeable future are not too great. Perhaps this is one of those rare instances in which a genuine philosophical contribution can be made by the elementary and secondary schools which may possibly be of use and value in higher education. After all, such a situation is not without precedent. I cite, for example, the principle of taking into account the needs of the learner when constructing a curriculum. This is a development that was established in the elementary and secondary schools before it was accepted (albeit grudgingly) by most college curriculum builders.

Let us now shift to another aspects of social studies teaching in which epistemological considerations are taking on increasing importance. I refer to the very significant development whereby the social studies teacher is not only teaching the substance of the social sciences to students but also inducting the students into an understanding of the methodology of the social scientist. In other words the teacher is now concerned with the what of the social sciences and the how of the social scientist. The work of our colleagues in the physical and natural sciences and in mathematics has given a great impetus to the idea of getting students to grasp the way in which knowledge claims are verified in these three disciplines. Jerome Bruner in his much quoted book, The Process of Education (1960), places particular emphasis on the need for students to see what he calls the "structure" of a given discipline. By this he means not only the major elements and ideas binding the subject together but also the manner in which knowledge is gained in the subject. Although this type of approach to the social studies perhaps reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, it is by no means totally ignored in current curricula. This approach attempts to get students to take an inside view, as it were, of the social scientist in operation. The student should have an opportunity to see the assumptions of which social scientists operate, the research tool they use for gathering data, the out-of-bounds-bounds and in-bounds area they have delimited for themselves, the tests of validity they use to verify findings -- in short, how they arrive at the knowledge they presumably have.

If the classroom teacher is inclined to accept this shift in emphasis in social studies teaching, he or she is faced with a tough philosophical decision. What particular way of knowing do they teach to their students? Is it one based on the rigid criteria of the natural scientist? Or is it the other end of the continuum, that is the verstehen, the subjective, or the poststructural approach to knowledge? Nor can teachers avoid this issue by arguing that all approaches are equally valid. If

they take this position they are in effect saying there can be no epistemological criteria for the social sciences. Aside from the fact that this position has limited support among social scientists and philosophers, the teacher is still propounding a presumed universal epistemological law governing the social sciences and the social studies; that is, the teacher is proclaiming as a universal law the assertion that there can be no basis for our presumed knowledge in the social sciences.

Note the difference between this problem and the earlier one contained in the reference to C. P. Snow's Two Cultures. The earlier problem is essentially one of deciding what knowledge to accept as valid because we accept the manner by which it is acquired. The latter problem is the even more pervasive one of deciding which way of knowing we want the young in our society to accept, for in a larger sense when we teach a method of thinking we are also teaching content. The two are inseparable.

Ontology

Our next area of focus is the problem of ontology as it related to social studies teaching. I am aware, incidentally, of the legitimate differences of opinion among writers on philosophy as to a proper classification scheme involving ontology and metaphysics. Sometimes they are used interchangeable, both denoting the study of ultimate reality. Sometimes one is used as a sub-category of the other; at other times the order is reversed. One of the reasons I use the word ontology here is because metaphysics has taken on a connotation of so much concern with the supernatural and abtruse that it is assumed there is little relationship between it and the social sciences. This is of course a mistaken assumption but it does suggest perhaps that a more fruitful approach to the study of reality can be made by considering it basically as an ontological problem. This connotes a concern with physical as well as ideational reality.

I need not review in detail for you the many problems associated with a determination of what is real. For example, there are those who argue that reality can be comprehended only through the senses. Only what is amenable to touch, smell, taste, sight or hearing is real; all else is a figment of the imagination. To others, ideas have as much reality as physical objects. If we apply this problem of what is real to the social sciences we are faced with such questions as these: Is there such a thing as a "group mind?" What about the idea of democracy? Is it a reality in the same way that the Congress of the United States is a reality? If it is, what really are its components? We frequently ascribe to democracy the key components of freedom, equality and fraternity. What precisely constitutes freedom? Certainly the usual cliche, "absence of restraint," does not adequately characterize freedom. Similarly, the cliche "all men are created equal" is not adequate for a comprehensive understanding of democracy.

Let me interject parenthetically here that some of the work in linguistic analysis has been useful in addressing the issue of reality. Wittgenstein's (1967) treatment of concepts, for example, raises some disturbing questions about the way we define and use concepts in the social studies. His analysis does not support the usual definition of a concept (e.g. power, authority, culture) in social studies as a "general idea, usually expressed by a word. which represents a class or group of things or actions having certain characteristics in common." (Quillen and Hanna, 1961, p. 187). Aumaugher's doctoral dissertation (1978) dealing with the concept of concepts, supports Wittgenstein's analysis. He concludes "that the accounts of what a concept is, given by some social studies theorists, indicate that what their understanding of what a concept is are limited, superficial, and inaccurate." (1978, p. 119-120)

To further illustrate the problem of ontology with respect to social studies teaching let me take one concept for somewhat more intensive analysis. I refer to the idea of individuality. In one form or another it is certainly an idea which nearly all members of a democratic society cite as a desideratum. From the radical left to the radical right we give lip service to the individual, and no political party has as one of its platforms the denigration of the worth of the individual. It is true, of course, that they differ on what kind of political and economic system can best contribute to individual fulfillment.

If the individual is presumed to occupy such an exalted place in our democratic society and if social studies teachers are expected to transmit a conception of individuality to succeeding generations, it appears logical to ask the question, just what is individuality or individualism? And, more basically, just what is an individual? On this latter question the obvious answer may be that the individual consists of the physical, corporal being of the species called homo sapiens. But is this really an adequate identification of any individual? What about his beliefs, his values, his ideas of right and wrong, of truth, of beauty? Surely if one were to give the essence of the reality of some entity like the Congress of the United States, it would be quite inadequate if one were to tell about the physical structure called the Capitol, or the chambers called the Senate and the House of Representatives. A real conception of Congress would also include such intangibles as lobbying, logrolling, compromise for the sake of political expediency, the influence of pressure groups, and even the personality structure of key members.

Similarly, a conception of the individual which equates him or her with only the physical being may not only be inadequate, it may be unreal or at least not as real as some other conception of the individual. For the purpose of pursuing this argument further let us pose a conception of the individual that is markedly different from the one commonly assumed and accepted today. What I am suggesting as a possible alternative is

analogous to a Copernican revolution on the relationship of the individual to the social environment in which the individual is immersed and from which the individual derives most of his or her cherished beliefs and values. Stated simply, this alternative conception removes the physical individual from the center of the social system and places the institutionalized individual there instead. In other words social institutions don't revolve about the physical individual; rather the individual revolves about the institutions, and the individual as an institutionalized being is a truer conception of the reality of individualism than is the physical being.

I warned you that this is a radically different conception of individuality, and I shall add parenthetically that I am not persuaded that it is the ultimate in its depiction of what really an individual is. On the other hand it is certainly not a fictitious position. The philosopher Elijah Jordan not only strongly defends this conception of individuality but states his case more emphatically than I have above. "The 'individual' of modern ethical theory," he writes in The Good Life, "has no existence and never had existence." (1949, p. 227)

I cite the above differing conceptions of individuality to drive home the point that the social studies teacher cannot avoid problems of an ontological or metaphysical nature. Think of the many instances in a typical social studies program from the elementary through the secondary schools in which there are inevitable references to the place of the individual in society. We speak of the individual's role with respect to his family, the community, the school, political institutions, economic behavior, and a host of other instances. I am merely suggesting that the teacher needs to ask, "What conception of individuality do I have underlying these relationships?" And, incidentally, if you are inclined to think that the conception I have cited as an example is so far-fetched as not even to merit consideration, may I remind you that precisely the same widespread kind of belief was held with respect to the relationship of the earth to the sun prior to the revolutionary pronouncements of Galileo and Copernicus. Widespread or even unanimous agreement, in other words, is not a valid criterion for determining reality. And finally, just as a sheer exercise in fantasy if nothing else, think through in your own mind how differently you would teach if -- I repeat, if -- this new interpretation turns out to be a more adequate depiction of reality than is your present conception.

Axiology

The third major area of our concern, axiology, has received more attention in the educational literature than have the other two. In recent years especially, we have had reminders and admonitions from all quarters of American life that the school must concern itself with values -- values in our political heritage, values in our economic system, values in things spiritual, values in things secular. The flood of words on this

assures her that all is in keeping with the principle of cultural relativity and she self-satisfyingly moves on, reassured that all her systems are "go."

But nagging doubts have a way of persisting. In keeping with this doubting attitude, let us assume the role of the devil's advocate among the social scientists. Specifically let us see what kind of a critique can be logically made of the concept of cultural relativity.

First. Cultural relativity is logically self-contradictory. By its very nature it asserts a certain value judgment to be universal and at the same time maintains that all values are culturally relative. And what value does it present as universal? The very value of cultural relativity itself. The cultural relativist takes the universal position that no society can validly judge another society. This is inherently contradictory.

Second. The criterion by which the cultural relativist justifies the autonomy of a given society in matters of value is that the society has survived with this particular value pattern and this survival itself is face value validation of the society's pattern of beliefs. But if we examine this argument of survival, we find that it too contains some loopholes. Consider, for example, the typical newspaper story that is carried about the person who has just celebrated his one hundredth birthday. To the inevitable question of what do you attribute your longevity to, the respondent may reply, "I drink a pint of whiskey and smoke ten pipefuls of tobacco a day." The obvious question arises: did he survive because of or in spite of his peculiar practices? The situation is similar with the criterion of survival as a justification of the values of a given society. A society may survive in spite of its values and because it is accidentally favored by climate, by topography, or by other natural resources.

Third. If one culture cannot judge another, then each and every culture is absolute with respect to all others. If each culture is autonomous and absolute then all aspects within the culture -- including individuals -- are relative to it. Anthropologist Melville Herskovits (1960) says that the individual must adhere to the values of his culture, otherwise there would be no order. Where then does this put the inherent dignity and worth of the individual? He is not only reduced in dignity but he is stripped of worth. For he is relative to his culture; and his culture, being absolute, is relative to no one or no think. This makes the individual a non-autonomous entity.

The unforeseen trapholes that lurk within the concept of cultural relativity are disturbingly present in some of the current literature and instructional materials relating to global education. The problem arises out of the fact that some textual materials and teachers mistakenly equate the concept of cultural

relativity to that of moral relativity and then extend the latter concept to moral equivalency. We unnecessarily burden valid efforts in global education with such untenable treatment of the issue of values. The recent National Council for the Social Studies ad hoc committee report (1987) on global education had as one of its most vexing problems the explication of values in global studies.

We could elaborate on this critique of cultural relativity but even this scant treatment suggests the power-packed problems that inhere in any teachings that concerns itself with values. My point in criticizing the concept of cultural relativity is not to build an airtight critique but to suggest that some of our most common assumptions underlying social studies teaching may well turn out to be fallacious or at least equivocal. Without an occasional examination of our educational conscience we may permit these assumptions to establish a kind of squatter's sovereignty in our philosophical domain.

Before we conclude this elementary treatment of philosophical considerations associated with a discipline of the social studies, we should consider, even if briefly, some opposing viewpoints. For this purpose I shall use as a point of departure the provocative recent publication, Power and Criticism: Poststructural Investigations in Education, by my colleague, Cleo Cherryholmes (1988). As the sub-title implies, the very idea of structure as it applies to a discipline, a curriculum, a taxonomy of educational objectives, and presumably to a philosophy itself, is faulted. Structuralism as exemplified currently in education, according to Cherryholmes, contains these fatal flaws: 1) It is frequently invalid logically by virtue of its employing a kind of circular reasoning. 2) It obscures and inhibits counter structures that potentially could result in more suitable educational practice. 3) It does not adequately address the issue of meaning. 4) It either ignores or underplays the effects of power in contemporary society.

There can be no studies in the foundations of education, Cherryholmes argues, because such studies imply a structural base that has never existed. Since I have used the word structure previously in this paper to describe the ingredients of a philosophy of social studies, I feel compelled to respond to the Cherryholmes book as well as to the general criticisms of structuralism. And to put this response in some kind of context let me refer to the use of structuralism in other academic disciplines, especially anthropology. In anthropological literature the term usually is linked with functionalism and is frequently treated as a single hyphenated word: structuralsim-functionalism. Spencer (1965) presents the structural-functional argument in this form.

Structure implies and integration. Analysis of integration as process provides one of the more interesting aspects of

contemporary research in social anthropology. Every society possesses what may be termed functional prerequisites, forms necessary to its perpetuation, such elements as may relate to procreation, recruitment, shared cognitive systems, goals, and orientations. (1965, p. 15)

In a simpler form, structuralism-functionalism can be illustrated by the following series of questions and answers.

What role does the social institution of marriage play in a society? It is part of the structure of that society. What purpose does it serve? It serve the function of providing an orderly means for the formation of family and the rearing of children. Why do we have the social institution of family and child rearing? To contribute to a stable social structure in the society.

Stated in this extreme form the argument can be criticized on the basis of being circular. Jarvie elaborates on these and other drawbacks in the theory of structuralism-functionalism and concludes that his various criticisms "were surely not difficult to understand or anticipate." (1965, p. 28) But, in answer to the query as to why the theory is still sustained, he argues that the reasons is "its manifest fruitfulness as an [sic] heuristic. to discover or to stimulate investigation."

And this brings us back to Cherryholmes, structuralism in education, and a discipline of the social studies. The various structural models that have been developed by educators -- whether they are Tyler's conception of the curriculum or Bloom's taxonomy of objectives (both of which are strongly criticized by Cherryholmes) -- have been useful <u>as heuristic devices</u>. They have contributed to informative dialogue and discourse in education. They have not been presented, nor have they been treated, as immutable structures, destined to survive unchanged with the pyramids. So it is also with my initial efforts here.

We are now at the end of our crude initial trail. What I have attempted to do is examine a discipline called the social studies. What is the nature of knowledge in the social studies? What is the nature of reality in the social studies? What is the nature of values in the social studies? The questions I have raised are in no sense intended to encompass all that can be said on the relationship of philosophy to the teaching of the social studies. In a larger sense we may even regard the very raising of questions as the most valuable function that philosophical inquiry can serve whether it be in relation to the social studies or any other topic. This process of elementary philosophical analysis I have tried to weave into the structure of my preceding remarks. It was Socrates who said, "The unexamined life is not worth living." For us social studies teachers we may paraphrase this to say, "The unexamined discipline is not worth teaching."

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A COMMENTARY

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The three authors, Nelson, Longstreet, and Wronski, were asked to address the theme, "A Discipline of Social Studies," with the hope of establishing a context from which a future theme, "Beliefs that Discipline Social Studies," could be drawn. I do not wish to suggest that the argument concerning social studies as a disciplinary field is set to rest. I do wish to suggest that the three authors provided a substantial base from which to argue that social studies could claim with other emerging fields, alongside the traditional social sciences, that there are a set of beliefs that discipline social studies. The purpose of this commentary is to set the stage for a continuing dialogue on what those beliefs might be.

In terms of beliefs that discipline the social studies there is a continuum along which lie at least three bench marks, reference points, concerning the existence of those beliefs. One is that there are no beliefs. The second is that there are beliefs, but not common beliefs. The third is that there are common beliefs that emerge from the historical and philosophical foundations of the social studies. As Longstreet points out, social studies tends to be taught in such a way that the first two bench marks would find much support based upon how the social studies curriculum is actually taught in most schools. However, in spite of evidence on actual practice, the third bench mark, that there are common beliefs that have emerged over the history of the social studies movement, is the one that will be discussed in the remainder of this commentary. I hypothesize that there are beliefs that discipline the decisions on purpose, method, and content, in short, how the social studies is organized and taught. Nevertheless, it does not follow that because there might be a set of beliefs, those beliefs have a single interpretation. In fact, I have argued for some twenty years that there are at least three traditional views of those common beliefs. But first, What are those common beliefs? and In what context do they exist?

BELIEFS THAT DISCIPLINE THE SOCIAL STUDIES

Obviously, the beliefs of social studies educators that might lead to a discipline field of study have not been clearly articulated. Some might describe the lack of articulation as an identity crisis, that it is a field without clear boundaries,

beliefs that govern the problem to be studied, the organization of content and the teaching of that content in the classroom. Is there a reason to encourage the identification of a set of social studies beliefs so that joining the field becomes a clear statement about boundaries, problems to be studied, organization of content, and the teaching of that content in the classroom? Some classroom teachers and most social studies educators would probably agree that it's about time: no, it's past time.

One other thought, the field is a mystery to most people even though they may have graduated from a school system that claims to practice social studies. A college graduate must at times have wondered why a preparation in elementary education or social science and humanities could end with certification to teach social studies when only three or less credit hours out of a total baccalaureate program were actually devoted to the field of social studies. A lack of clear image about beliefs is directly linked to **what** social studies is and **why** it exists.

What is Social Studies? The field of social studies was conceived a bit after the turn of the twentieth century as a school curriculum from kindergarten to the twelfth grade that would deal primarily with citizenship education. Those who consider themselves social studies teachers might generally believe the following: (1) social studies is preparation for citizenship, (2) the content to be studied should be concepts and themes that reflect on social/personal issues, (3) the content should be interdisciplinary and integrated throughout the social studies curriculum, and (4) the practice of the process of decision making is the guide to classroom instruction. How did social studies teachers arrive at these four beliefs? Imagine the period in American history at the end of the 1800's and the beginning of the twentieth century. The country had just passed through a metamorphosis -- everything was changing and the country was no longer the rural, agrarian society of the founding fathers of the seventeenth century. Assuming that all the four beliefs above are basic to social studies, a definition might be:

> Social studies is the interdisciplinary integration of social science and humanities concepts for the purpose of practicing citizenship skills on critical social issues.

"Citizenship" is emphasized because, despite all the differences in meaning and application of social studies, the goal which most teachers accept is that students should be prepared to become functioning citizens in a democracy. In short, the goal of social studies instruction is citizenship. "Integration" is emphasized because social studies is the only school subject which deliberately attempts to integrate concepts from interdisciplinary social science, history and humanities.

The trend in modern education is to fragment knowledge into ever smaller bites and from bites into megabytes. There are almost no school subjects that intend to integrate knowledge, almost none with the exception of social studies. A social studies argument might be that citizenship requires the skill to integrate knowledge. Citizens should face the problems of life not as sociologists, historians, economists, or anthropologists, but rather as people who take into consideration all of the knowledge that they have so that they might live more effective lives. Citizens face social issues that require an integration of life experiences. From the social studies reform point of view, the continuous education of citizens in the fragmenting of knowledge without an equal emphasis on integration is poor preparation for the office of citizenship.

Why Social Studies? Change is what social studies is all about, how to control change. Why this emphasis on change? What is the problem? If anthropology and history tell us anything, they tell us we are constantly in a state of social change. If change happens slowly as in the stone age when man spent half a million years learning to make stone tools, humans adjust slowly to change. If change happens very rapidly as in a highly developed technological society, then change can be dislocating. Rapid change can be unsettling, leading to unhappiness, fractured families, identity crisis, unemployment, drug abuse, crime, world wars, economic depression, crisis and chaos. An argument could be made that the field early in its development was captured by the social science and history disciplines that were and are concerned essentially with the past as well as their own structure and function, and thus social studies has not clearly emerged as the subject that prepares citizens for change. The field is suspended between a social studies actually taught in school as static, linear, chronology with emphasis on structure function and the reform social studies belief that change, crisis, and social/personal issues are the grist for practicing the process of decision making.

Social Studies: The Subject About Change

When the United States was emerging as a technological society, those who would look into the future asked the question, "How do we teach citizens to control the chaos brought on by rapid change? In short, How can democracy work if there is chaotic change?" The more rapid the change, the greater the chaos. "How do we in a technological society empower the American citizens to make effective, critical decisions? How do American citizens learn to control their lives when they are in a constant state of change?" The social studies curriculum was to be the school subject that focused on change with the aim of practicing decision making citizenship skills as one means of taking control of life.

The reform was a powerful new idea at the beginning of the century. That idea was rather simple: citizens could learn to

control their own lives (think for themselves) by practicing the skills of gathering knowledge, reasoning, valuing, and participating. The practice of citizenship skills was not new, but that those skills would be formally practiced as a part of a school curriculum was new. In the beginning, as suggested above, social studies was created as a reform movement in response to a changing society where persistent social, political, and economic problems were causing instability and chaos. Immigration of what was then considered undesireables and also the traumatic experience of World War I contributed to the chaos helping to create an environment for educational reform. Social studies was simply a suggested change in the school's approach to citizenship education.

Traditionally citizenship education was taught by example in rural, Jeffersonian, small town America, where in the one room schoolhouse of the late 1880's the subjects of history, civics, and geography were taught separately for the purpose of citizenship indoctrination. There was no intent to practice citizenship skills in an integrated school curriculum. Practicing citizenship skills was left to the family and community. The schools' citizenship purpose was to Americanize all citizens through the melting pot called the public school. But times have changed, suppose the family was fractured and community became a large, impersonal, urban sprawl, what agency would pick up the responsibility to practice citizenship skills? Of course, the school would try to replace the lost family and community; social studies was to become the trainer of citizens.

Education to Control Change and Crisis: The Foundation of Social Studies

In the early twentieth century social scientists, educators, and social workers envisioned a citizenship curriculum that would educate all the children about how to control their urban interdependence, in short, how to live effectively in an ever more complex. difficult, chaotic world. Educators reasoned that social problems should not be left to chance which is what would happen if both family and community ceased to function as important. Students had to practice on social issues and learn how to participate. The school social studies curriculum was to deal with questions about the quality of one's life. The practice of decision making skills determined one's quality of life. In other words, living an effective life meant making effective decisions. In summary, social studies was educational reform founded on a vision of a rapidly changing, interdependent, democratic, and problem-laden, crisis society that required some systematic rational thought process that would provide general training in the skill of citizenship education.

What did the reform mean by decision making? In fact, decision making is complex, and teachers have different interpretations of how schools should promote the practice of decision making. The professional organization for social

studies teachers. the National Council for the Social Studies, in an attempt to bring some consensus to the field, has suggested a set of curriculum guidelines. These guidelines translate the larger goal of citizenship into four skill objectives. According to the guidelines, all social studies instruction should include practice of the four skills at each grade level. It is the practice of these skills that provides an integrated consistent approach to citizenship education throughout a social studies curriculum. The four following skills are those a citizen would use to integrate information and reasoning to make citizenship decisions.

1. The skill to gain knowledge about the human condition which includes past, present, and future.
2. Acquire skills necessary to process information.
3. Develop skills to examine values and beliefs.
4. Apply knowledge through active participation in society.

What should be the end product of gaining knowledge, processing information, examining values in a democratic society? -- using those skills to participate in the decision making that is basic to a democratic system.

Opposition to Reform The social studies reform was not universally accepted. In fact, it could be argued that the reform never has been universally applied throughout the American school system. There has been a century of continuous strong opposition to the suggested reform, first by those who felt that citizenship education was best served by continuing 1800's citizenship education. That education featured history, geography, and government as separate courses with the aim of indoctrinating Americanism, in short, melding all citizens to the same values and beliefs.

Other opponents to reform felt that the study of contemporary social issues would lack substance. Social studies, some argued, would degenerate into a study of popular culture, and if there was decision making, those decisions would lack substance. The proper issues to study, according to some social scientists and historians, were those from the past, or those issues that persisted in each of the social sciences. Also, a popular belief was that a basic structure yielded concepts that should be the center of any citizenship education program. Thus, a substantive issue emphasizes "hard" basic concepts that are best applied in discrete social science disciplines. Interdisciplinary integration would confuse the issue and weaken the application of concepts to the real world.

Strong opposition has always been voiced by professional organizations that support the social sciences and humanities. The interdisciplinary integration of facts, concepts and generalizations of the social sciences would, from their point of view, diminish the importance of their disciplines. Such an integration of content might turn disciplined social science and

history content into soft, undisciplined, disjointed generalizations that would allow students to remain ignorant of the meaning of history and social sciences as significant ways to think about society. Citizenship courses that draw their content from the separate social sciences and history as found in most colleges, was to be preferred. Historians have always declared their primacy, meaning that history should be the core of all citizenship instruction with emphasis on linear, chronological organization of content. Other fields: economics, political science, sociology/anthropology, psychology, and recently geography, declared their ownership of first place among other social science fields in preparation of citizens. In short, none of the social sciences and humanities found the social studies reform of citizenship education, based on the study of issues, the practice of decision making, and an interdisciplinary integration approach appealing, and in the end would essentially reject either part or all of the reform suggesting that social studies be replaced by the "hard" social sciences undiluted by the unrealistic social studies reform.

Summary/Conclusion

In summary, defining the reform beliefs of the social studies movement flows from the recognition that the United States is a pluralistic, self-governing society in which conflict and change are realities. The accelerating pace of technological change and deepening social problems led some to believe that future citizens needed formal school citizenship training in the skills of self-government. Those skills were not practiced during formal education in the 1800's. At the beginning of the twentieth century the traditional collection of courses in government, history, and geography, which were taught in a linear, chronological, structure function way to shape right values and behavior, gave way, in part, to a proposed educational reform. The reform proposed a new field of study which became social studies. The field emphasized a (1) interdisciplinary integration approach to identifying social science and humanities concepts with the intent of (2) practicing citizenship skills including decision making on (3) contemporary social problems and issues.

What conclusions could be drawn about the beliefs that support the reform: first, the goal of social studies is preparation for citizenship and involves an integration of concepts in a spiraling scope and sequence taken largely from the humanities and the social sciences. Second, the national professional organization for social studies teachers, the National Council for the Social Studies, proposed that one way to integrate social studies in a scope and sequence was to apply the four skill objectives: (1) gaining knowledge, (2) processing information, (3) clarifying values, and (4) engaging in social participation, in every social studies classroom. In short, citizenship is not so much a definition as it is a set of four skill objectives which, if followed, would prepare students to

function as self-governing, decision making citizens. However, though there appears to be agreement within the field on the goal and four skill objectives, a significant disagreement continues on just how those four objectives should be applied in the classroom.

The field of social studies is changing and emerging as are all other subject fields. The fact that there continues to be disagreement about the meaning and conflict over definition should not be a source of discouragement, but rather a sign of strength and vitality. Simply, social studies was created to prepare citizens for a changing, complex, chaotic twentieth century. The social studies practiced in today's classroom is not necessarily an example of beliefs envisioned as a reform at the turn of the century. Practicing the skill objectives is not yet standard practice in most social studies classes. Students, teachers, and school systems were never asked except on paper to integrate the twelve year social studies curriculum. Social/personal issues and the decision making process were never the heart of the program. What actually exists in many secondary schools is not the reform social studies but the traditional citizenship education of the 1800's where linear sequence and structure function continue to dominate the organization of concepts and classroom instruction.

Where are we now? From the point of view of some educators the reform social studies was a grand idea, given the changes in the United States at the turn of the century. The goal of preparing students in a school setting to be effective citizens in the twentieth century made a lot of sense. The reform emerged as four beliefs that were to structure and discipline the field of social studies. That structure and discipline, however, are not widely accepted because they do not make sense to those who have a different vision of citizenship. Nevertheless, the beliefs exist and, though not necessarily the basis for present classroom teaching practice, do appear often in the literature about the organization and teaching of social studies. The point is, social studies reforms can discipline the teaching about citizenship, but first the beliefs of that discipline must be known. If the field continues to remain a mystery to all but a few, including many of the teachers who each day represent the field in the classroom, then the reform will continue to be only an historic event, and therefore, the concern for identifying beliefs that discipline social studies would be irrelevant. Clearly, if there are common beliefs, as I believe, then the task ahead is to identify beliefs and focus on them as the nature of the social studies